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This paper develops an adaptive learning formulation of an extension to the Ball,
Mankiw and Reis (2005) sticky information model that incorporates endogenous inat-
tention. We show that, following an exogenous increase in the policymaker’s preferences
for price vs. output stability, the learning process can converge to a new equilibrium
in which both output and price volatility are lower.
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1 Introduction
Recently, a number of researchers have conjectured that the decline in U.S. economic volatil-
ity in the post 1984 period – the “Great Moderation” – was the result of improved monetary
policy, e.g. Orphanides (2002), Bernanke (2004), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). These
papers suggest that a change in the stance of monetary policy towards greater price stability
helped induce the lower volatility in output and prices. In the monetary policy literature
there is not a consensus on the channels through which policy would be able to achieve an
∗We are indebted to Larry Ball, Bruce Preston, and Ricardo Reis for their detailed comments. Financial
support from the National Science Foundation Grant is gratefully acknowledged. The views stated herein
are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System or of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
overall improvement in stability. Thus an open question is how a monetary authority, also
ignorant of the precise monetary policy transmission mechanism, can induce stability.
This paper extends Branch, Carlson, Evans and McGough (2006) (BCEM) by incorpo-
rating real-time adaptive learning by both the policy authority and private sector agents.
BCEM is, itself, an extension of the Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2005) (BMR) model of sticky
information since it endogenizes the rate of information acquisition. In BCEM we studied
output and price volatility as a function of the policymaker’s preference parameter ω, and we
showed that it is possible for the resulting policy “frontier” to be upward sloping if the rate
of information acquisition λ, i.e. the rate of inattention 1−λ, is sufficiently responsive. The
parameter ω measures the weight in the policymaker’s loss function placed on price variance
relative to output variance and we refer to a high value of ω as a low degree of activism since
in effect it corresponds to a reduced desire to smooth output. The key is that by switching
emphasis to greater price stability, the policymakers can induce an endogenous response in
λ that lowers overall economic volatility – thereby avoiding the usual trade-off between price
and output stability.
This paper elaborates on the mechanics of this process by developing a natural setting in
which policymakers, as well as private agents, are neither naive nor fully informed rational,
but instead are boundedly rational in the spirit of Marcet and Sargent (1989), Sargent
(1999) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001). We go on to study whether in an adaptive
learning setting the simultaneous decline in economic volatility remains a possibility. If so,
the results presented here would provide additional theoretical support for a monetary policy
channel of the Great Moderation.
We consider a system initially in equilibrium and look, numerically, at the impact of
an exogenous increase in ω, i.e. a permanent decrease in policy activism. The numerical
results track the BCEM theoretical results showing that a simultaneous decline in price and
output volatility is possible, but with one significant difference. Initially, when the new policy
rule is implemented, output volatility rises in line with the “standard” view of a trade-off,
reflecting the transitional period in which λ adapts over time to its new lower equilibrium
level. However, in the long-run, output as well as price volatility decline permanently. Our
adaptive learning version of the model provides results that are more hopeful than those of
Sargent (1999) in the sense that with appropriate policy a permanent decrease in volatility
is possible.
2 BMR Model in Reduced Form
BMR develop a simple model, along the lines of Woodford (2003), with monopolistic com-
petition and optimal monetary policy. Their novelty is the information structure: agents
update their information with exogenous probability 0 < λ < 1 each period, and each
agent sets a price path optimally every period, subject to their information constraint.1 The
1Reis (2006) provides further microfoundations to this approach.
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(1− λ)jEt−j (pt + αyt + ut) (1)
yt = m̂t − pt, (2)
where pt is the price-level, yt is aggregate output, and ut = ρut−1 + εt are mark-up shocks
that follow a stationary AR(1) process.2 Equation (1) is a Phillips curve and represents the
aggregate supply relationship of the economy. Equation (2) is a quantity-equation theory of
aggregate demand and is derived from a cash-in-advance constraint. The variable m̂t is the
policy instrument set at time t−1 according to a rule that maximizes a second order welfare








for appropriately defined φj, ϕj. The key insight of BCEM is that, when λ is endogenous,
φ, ϕ depend on λ and vice-versa.
In BCEM agents are assumed to choose their information acquisition rate λ, given ag-
gregate λ̄, according to the best-response function










where Cλ2, C > 0, is the cost to updating and utilizing information at rate 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Here
p∗t (λ̄) is the optimal (full information) price at t and p̂t(λ) is the (agent-specific stochastic
process for the) price set at t by a firm with information acquisition rate λ. Like BMR, we
interpret broadly the costs of information updating, to include not just the cost of obtaining
but also the cost of processing the information. An Endogenous Inattention equilibrium is
defined by the fixed point λ∗ = T (λ∗). This a symmetric Nash equilibrium, between the
continuum of private agents and also the policymaker. In this “game” private agents choose
λ and the central bank chooses its policy.
In BCEM we considered the following policy experiment. If ω, the relative weight on
cross-sectional price variance in the central bank’s loss function, exogenously increases then,
for fixed λ, price variance decreases and output variance increases. However, with endogenous
λ, higher ω implies that λ∗ will decrease, reducing both price and output volatility. The
overall impact on output variance depends on the relative strengths of these effects, and
BCEM show that a simultaneous reduction in both price and output volatility is indeed
possible. The intuition for this result is clear: policy that responds more aggressively to
price volatility will induce an endogenous response in λ that will also lower output volatility.
2All variables are in log deviations form. BMR and BCEM also include demand shocks. We omit these
shocks to ease exposition.
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3 Adaptive Learning and Changes in Monetary Policy
The result of the policy experiment discussed above depends on the timing of the “game”
between policymakers and private agents. The structure of the model assumes a simultaneous
move game with ω parameterizing the preferences of the government. This timing assumption
results in a prisoner’s dilemma and the economy can be trapped in an inefficient outcome,
as in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Rogoff (1985). A decline in both price and output
volatility can obtain in the Nash equilibrium of this game, given an exogenous increase in
preferences ω. As an alternative, we could specify the structure as a Stackelberg game with
the government as the large player who moves first. In such a setting, policymakers could
announce a policy consistent with preferences less activist than their own, and thereby choose
their preferred point on the frontier.
Our own view is that it is more plausible to extend the bounded rationality viewpoint to
policymakers, as well as private agents, and to think in terms of an evolution and improve-
ment over time in the exercise of monetary policy.3 This view is in line with the hypothesis of
Bernanke (2004) and seems implicit in the discussions of monetary policy in both Svensson
(2003) and McCallum (2000). In this paper we will therefore assume that policymakers over
time arrive at the view that decreased policy activism can improve economic performance,
without them necessarily understanding all of the relevant mechanisms.
We model the expectations of both policymakers and private agents using the adaptive
learning approach described in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Least squares learning allows
policymakers and private agents to learn how to make optimal forecasts, given their infor-
mation sets, without knowing structural parameters, and also allows them to appropriately
track structural change. This makes policy and λ time-dependent. A natural question is:
to what type of equilibrium will this adaptive version of the economy converge (if any)? If,
after removing the strategic interaction of the model, the economy converges to the Nash
equilibrium/endogenous inattention outcome, then this provides additional support for the
BMR/BCEM model. This approach also allows us to consider the output-price volatility
trade-off in terms of stability under adaptation. If the relevant equilibria are stable then an
exogenous change in policymaker preferences could cause the economy to move to a lower
point on the upward sloping section of the policy frontier, thus resulting in reduced volatility
in both prices and output.
3.1 Real-time Learning Version of the Model
Policymakers choose their policy instrument in order to satisfy the first-order condition
Et−1yt = −αωEt−1pt given their forecast for the price-level.4 This implies a rule
m̂t = (1− κ)Et−1pt, (4)
3In his comments on Orphanides and Williams (2005), Evans (2005, pp. 241-2) stresses the advantages
of models with “cognitive consistency” between private agents, policymakers and economists.
4In BMR the loss function is V ar(yt) + ωE(V ari(pit − pt)) and is minimized subject to (1).
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where κ = αω, for setting the policy instrument m̂t, at time t − 1. Such a rule is close
to the one studied, for example, by Taylor (1980), who refers to 1 − κ as the “degree of
accommodation” (to price shocks).5 In the numerical simulations below, it is convenient to
report the effects of the policy shift in terms of an increase in ω, but the policy change can
equivalently be interpreted simply in terms of a reduction in activism or in the degree of
accommodation. Implementation of this rule still requires forecasts of prices. Since we do
not want to assume full knowledge of the structure by policymakers we replace Et−1pt by
an econometric forecast Êt−1pt based on a reduced form time-series model.
6 In equilibrium,
the price process is MA(∞) and it is natural to assume that policymakers approximate this
process using an ARMA(r, q) specification. In addition we assume that the exogenous shocks
εt are observable at t, so that policymakers can use recursive least squares (RLS) to update
the estimates of their ARMA model’s parameters.7 Policymakers thus set m̂t according to
(4) with Et−1pt replaced by Êt−1pt.
In BMR, firms are price setters and would prefer to set price to
p∗t = pt + αyt + ut
each period. However, there is a cost to processing new information. We assume that firms do
not know the full economic structure and are thus unable to form fully rational expectations
or to compute the optimal λ, given their costs. Instead, firms hire consultants to provide
real-time estimates of both optimal price forecasts and of λt, given the costs to the firm of
updating prices at frequency λ. We think this set-up is a reasonable stylized description of
actual agent behavior.8
Consultants act as information gatherers, providing to firms forecasts of future optimal
prices as well as the optimal rate of information processing.9 Consultants, like the policy-
makers, are assumed not to know the full structure of the economy and to forecast using
a reduced form ARMA model. Each period consultants forecast the value of p∗t using an
ARMA(r, q) specification, with εt observable.
10 As before, the ARMA(r, q) can be estimated
5The F.O.C. is a “specific targeting rule” of the type advocated and discussed in detail by Svensson
(2003). As stressed by Svensson (2003), one of the advantages of this type of rule is that its specification
does not require knowledge of the full structure of the economy. We note, however, that Svensson does not
advocate money supply rules.
6Other implementations of bounded rationality are possible in which policymakers make use of their
knowledge of the structure. For a discussion of optimal monetary policy with structural parameter learning
see Evans and Honkapohja (2003). The key qualitative results of the current paper are unlikely to depend
on the detailed implementation of learning.
7See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a detailed discussion of least-squares learning in dynamic macro-
economics.
8For example, Carroll (2003) provides evidence that consumer expectations follow a distributed lag of
professional forecasters.
9The notion of a consultant is a descriptive device designed to remove the explicit strategic interaction
between agents. Some of the roles of consultant could be served by newspapers, business publications,
Central Bank forecasts or the forecasting community more generally.
10We could instead assume that policymakers forecast with an ARMA(r′, q′) with (r′, q′) possibly different
from (r, q). However, this would not change the results below. Similarly, we could instead have the consul-
tants forecast pt, yt and ut separately, and then combine them to construct the forecast of p∗t . The impact
on our results of this alternative set-up would be minimal.
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using RLS. Consultants are willing to provide Êtp
∗
t+k, for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., either free of charge
or for a fixed fee willingly paid by all firms; however, the consultants are aware that firms
incur a cost of information processing. The consultants therefore also provide to firms an
estimate of the optimal rate of information accrual, λt, by solving the firm’s optimization
problem (3) using an estimate of the mean-square forecast error in (3), based on their esti-
mated ARMA(r, q) process for p∗t .
It is worth emphasizing that although the consultants know the value of λt and have
memory of the conditional forecasts Êt−jp
∗
t , the consultants do not know the full structural
equations and so do not know how this translates into actual prices and, hence, actual
optimal prices. This learning set-up is constructed specifically so that none of the agents
know how λt affects the actual dynamics. Convergence to a Nash Equilibrium then provides
additional theoretical support for the endogenous inattention equilibrium concept.
The following system, written in recursive causal ordering, describes the evolution of the
economy under adaptive learning (and summarizes the preceding discussion):
Êt−1pt = {ARMA(r, q) Policy Maker Forecast}
m̂t = (1− κ)Êt−1pt, where κ = αω.
Êtp
∗
t+k, k = 0, 1, . . . = {ARMA(r, q) Consultant Forecast}








p∗t = αm̂t + (1− α)pt + ut,
where the last equation is obtained using the AD relation and the definition of p∗t .
We now address two questions: First, will this economy converge to the equilibrium
associated with a stable Nash equilibrium of the non-adaptive model? Second, suppose
that ω increases exogenously. Will the economy converge to a new, more “moderate” Nash
equilibrium?
3.2 Numerical Results
We first start with what BCEM term the benchmark case.11 We set α = .1, σ2ε = .1, C =
5, ρ = .85. We set the ARMA parameters to r = 1, q = 5 as these provide a good approx-
imation to the actual stochastic process. This parameterization yields an upward sloping
policy frontier. Figure 1 illustrates the results from a typical simulation when ω = 15.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
11These parameter values are chosen for illustrative purposes and are not calibrated in any serious sense.
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As indicated by Figure 1, λt converges to its Nash equilibrium value, marked by the
horizontal line in the top panel. In the bottom two panels, the time t estimates of the
unconditional variances of price and output are plotted. These estimates were obtained
using a moving average with window length 500; thus the horizontal scales in these figures
do not include the transient period. The horizontal lines in these panels correspond to the
theoretical variances of output and price at the associated Nash equilibrium.
The results of Figure 1 strongly suggest that the Nash outcome is stable under our
adaptive model. The intuition for this stability is as follows. For fixed λ, the ARMA
models are approximations to the true MA(∞) equilibrium price process. Since the true
process depends on the underparameterized ARMA models – through policy and λt – the
equilibrium here is similar to the Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE) defined in Evans
and Honkapohja (2001). Moreover, the RPE in models with an expectational structure
similar to the one presented here are stable under adaptive learning. Furthermore, for a
fixed price process we restrict attention to Nash equilibria that are stable fixed points of our
T-map in the sense that T ′(λ∗) < 1. Thus, it is not surprising (though not obvious) that
these two stable mechanisms imply convergence.
We now turn to examining the simultaneous decline in output and price volatility in
real-time. The conjecture is that as policy becomes less activist, there is a tendency for price
variance to decrease, resulting in an eventual decrease in equilibrium attentiveness, λ, that
induces lower output variance. We thus now assume that during the simulation there is an
exogenous increase in ω from ω = 15 to ω = 30. The increase in ω could be due to a shift
in policy stance accompanying the appointment of a conservative central banker, and could
be thought of either as exogenous or as a response by the government to a series of adverse
price shocks.
Figure 2 illustrates the results from a typical simulation. Initially, (after a transient
period of length 600), the economy is near the equilibrium corresponding to ω = 15. At
time t = 800, ω increases abruptly from 15 to 30. Figure 2 demonstrates that, prior to the
change in policy, the real-time learning dynamics are near their Nash equilibrium values.
Immediately following the policy change, price volatility plummets as predicted, but output
volatility rises. This reflects the fact that though λt is falling from its pre-shock level, it
has not yet reached its new equilibrium level; thus, temporarily, the usual trade-off exists.
As λt gets close to its new equilibrium level, however, both volatility time-series converge
to levels lower than those of the pre-shock equilibrium, and the economy exhibits a “Great
Moderation.”
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
We emphasize that we have not attempted to calibrate our model to provide a description
of the actual historical experience. Any serious exercise along these lines would require
significantly more elaborate detail for both the aggregate demand and the aggregate supply
sides of the model. Nonetheless, the finding that a Great Moderation is possible in the model,
with a boundedly rational policymaker and adaptive learning by all agents, is significant.
These results suggest that a possible application of the theoretical approach taken in this
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paper would be an empirical examination of the Great Moderation, allowing for policy change
and an endogenous response in the attentiveness of economic agents. Such an undertaking
is beyond the scope of the current paper.
4 Conclusion
This paper formulates an adaptive learning version of the endogenous inattention model of
Branch, Carlson, Evans and McGough (2006). In this formulation policymakers set policy in
order to satisfy their first order optimality condition but replace expectations based on the
structural model with recursively updated ARMA forecasts. Similarly, private sector agents
use an ARMA model to forecast their optimal price, given their rate of information acquisi-
tion. It was shown that this economy converges to the Endogenous Inattention equilibrium
of Branch, Carlson, Evans and McGough (2006). Moreover, with a change in policymaker
preferences, the central bank and the private-sector can eventually learn a new equilibrium
with both lower price and output variance. These results provide additional support for
the theoretical results in Branch, Carlson, Evans and McGough (2006), Ball, Mankiw and
Reis (2005) and others, since they show that the interaction of optimal policy and limited
attention on the part of private sector agents has important practical policy implications
that are not sensitive to the particular timing protocol of these models.
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  Figure 2.  Changes in policy preferences in real-time.  At time 800 w increases to 30. 
 
